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Finkelman: When International Law Was a Domestic Problem

WHEN INTERNATIONAL LAW WAS A
DOMESTIC PROBLEM
Paul Finkelman∗
This Article will focus on two interrelated aspects of human rights
law in the domestic context. First, I briefly examine the use of foreign
law by the United States in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This
history shows that in America’s first century there was a substantial
amount of borrowing of law from Europe, and that this foreign law
shaped, sometimes dramatically, the development of American law.1
Not all of this borrowing had to do with what we might identify as
"human rights" in the twenty-first century, but, much of it did.
Sometimes this foreign law was used to expand human rights; and at
other times it might be seen as "anti-human rights" in the sense that it
was used to suppress what the modern world would identify as human
rights. But, whether supportive of human rights or harmful to it, this
history shows that the United States has a long tradition of applying
foreign law involving human rights to our domestic law.
My second focus is on the fact that the American states treated each
other as “foreign entities” from the founding of the country until the
beginning of the Civil War. This practice was a function of the federal
republic model, which loosely defined concepts of state sovereignty and
state independence. At the same time, states also treated the national
government as a foreign power. In its most extreme form, this notion of
state sovereignty would lead to secession and civil war.
When American states faced issues of slavery and freedom, the
states often refused to recognize and give comity to the laws of other
states. Thus, from 1787 to at least 1865, notions of international human
rights law in the domestic context usually involved interstate relations,
rather than relations between the United States and foreign nations. The
most significant aspect of this domestic use of international law concepts
involved slavery and race.
One example of this interstate conflict over human rights law, which
I will discuss at some length below, involved the status of free black
sailors who entered Southern ports. Starting in 1822, South Carolina
refused to recognize the free status of black sailors serving on Northern

∗

President William McKinley Distinguished Professor of Law and Public Policy,
Albany Law School.
1
For a much more elaborate discussion of the use of foreign law by American courts,
see Paul Finkelman, Foreign Law and American Constitutional Interpretation: A Long and
Venerable Tradition, 63 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 29 (2007).
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and British ships when those ships docked in Charleston.2 Almost every
other Southern coastal state followed South Carolina’s lead. In the 1840s,
Massachusetts sent commissioners to South Carolina and Louisiana to
resolve disputes over this issue, but these efforts failed. Then, in Dred
Scott v. Sandford3 the Supreme Court held that blacks could never be
citizens of the nation and had no rights under the Constitution, implying
that Southern states had an absolute right to prohibit the entrance of free
blacks from other states.4 The issue remained unresolved until the end
of the Civil War and was finally settled with the ratification of the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, which recognized the rights of
blacks as citizens of the United States and guaranteed their right to travel
freely throughout the nation.5
Another example of how the application of human rights law
affected American domestic law concerns the status of slaves voluntarily
brought by their masters into free states. Before the 1840s almost all the
states—North and South—recognized that freedom attached to slaves
voluntarily taken into the North, although some northern states passed
laws to modify this rule by granting southern masters a right of limited
transit. By the 1850s this had changed. Most Southern states no longer
accepted the idea that residence in a free state would emancipate a slave
while most Northern states aggressively asserted the right to emancipate
slaves who, with their masters’ permission or acquiescence, set foot on
free soil. Similar issues arose over the status of fugitive slaves and of
northerners who helped fugitive slaves who had escaped to the North.
I. FEAR OF FOREIGN LAW
This symposium focuses for the most part, on the problem of
applying international human rights law to American domestic law.
Most of us think of international law or human rights law in the
domestic context as involving some other system of law being either
borrowed or imposed by outsiders.
2
“AN ACT for the better regulation and government of Free Negroes and Persons of
Color; and for other purposes,” 7 Stat. S.C. 461 (1822).
3
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
4
This might still have left open the possibility that the southern states could not
interfere with the free black citizens from Britain and other foreign states who came into
their ports, but given the Court’s strong support of local police powers, in such cases as
Miln v. Mayor of New York City, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837) and Cooley v. Bd. of Port Wardens
of Philadelphia, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1852), it seems likely that the Court would have
upheld the right of the slave states to prohibit foreign blacks from entering their ports.
5
In Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867) the Supreme Court settled this issue
six months before the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. The modern court
reaffirmed this right under the Fourteenth Amendment in Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
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For the paranoid, this idea conjures up notions of blue-helmeted
foreigners occupying American territory, arresting our politicians for
alleged misdeeds, and dragging them to The Hague, Geneva, or some
other foreign place, to be tried and punished without a jury or a bill of
rights to protect them. In the mind of Justices Antonin Scalia or Clarence
Thomas, this idea conjures up a world in which the Supreme Court
overturns state or federal law on the basis of “foreign moods, fads, or
fashions.”6
For the hopeful, this idea might mean that the United States signs-on
to various human rights conventions and treaties, and actually
implements them.7 This might be in part an extension of existing federal
law, such as the Alien Tort Claims Act,8 which allows non-Americans to
gain substantial private justice in our courts for wrongs committed
overseas. Oddly, despite the fear of “foreign law” by some people
(especially those such as Justices Thomas and Scalia, who glory in the
intent of the framers), the Alien Tort Claims Act has been with us since
the adoption of the Judiciary Act of 1789.9 Thus, in one sense, it seems
clear that the members of the First Congress, who also wrote and passed
the Bill of Rights, believed in the implementation of international human
rights law in the United States courts. Another notion of human rights
law might be that U.S. law simply allows claims to be brought in our
courts under international concepts of human rights as well as U.S.
statutes. Alternatively, acknowledging international human rights might
be as simple as the Court accepting, as Justice Anthony M. Kennedy did
in Roper v. Simmons, that “[i]t is proper that we acknowledge the
overwhelming weight of international opinion against the juvenile death
penalty.”10
Roper overturned a death penalty for someone who
committed a capital offense when he was a minor. Justice Kennedy’s
majority opinion cited an amicus brief from the Human Rights
Committee of the Bar of England and Wales. Relying on this brief, and
6
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (quoting Foster v.
Florida, 537 U.S. 990 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring)). See also Finkelman, Foreign Law and
American Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 1 (discussing this in larger detail).
7
Although it had a leading role in promulgating the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, in years since that time the United States has signed but not ratified, or signed and
ratified with reservations, declarations, or understandings to which other states object,
various international treaties concerning human rights. See Racism, Human Rights &
Worldwide
Issues,
http://academic.udayton.edu/race/06hrights/unitednations/US
Status.htm (summarizing the status of U.S. action with respect to key international treaties);
see generally Joe Stork, Human Rights and U.S. Policy, http://www.fpif.org/reports/
human_rights_and_us_policy.
8
Judiciary Act, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006)).
9
Judiciary Act, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
10
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005).
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other arguments, Kennedy noted “[t]he opinion of the world
community, while not controlling our outcome, does provide respected
and significant confirmation for our own conclusions.”11
II. FOREIGN LAW IN EARLY AMERICAN LAW
Foreign law has been part of our jurisprudence since our first courts
met. Nineteenth century jurists cited foreign courts, continental legal
theorists, and even Roman law. American courts often followed new
legal ideas coming from outside the United States. For example, the
“fellow servant rule” in labor law began in Britain,12 but American courts
quickly adopted it. Under this rule, courts held that large employers,
such as railroads and factories, were not liable to their employees for
work-place accidents caused by other employees’ negligence. Rather,
the injured worker had to sue his negligent “fellow servant,” who in
most cases would be judgment proof. This rule had the effect of shifting
one cost of industrialization—the care of injured workers—from
investors and capitalists to the workers themselves and their families. By
the end of the nineteenth century, almost every state adopted this rule,
which began in Great Britain in the 1830s.13
In the 1820s the Supreme Court turned to foreign law to justify the
taking of Indian land. In Johnson v. M’Intosh,14 Chief Justice John
Marshall, speaking for a unanimous Court, turned to European notions
of conquest, land use, and property ownership when considering the
nature of Indian land ownership. The Court used these foreign law
concepts to proclaim that Indians, neither as individuals nor as nations,
had any permanent title to their land. Counsel in the case cited a
plethora of foreign law sources,15 including the works of Emmerich de
Id.
Priestly v. Fowler, (1837) 150 Eng. Rep. 1030. South Carolina accepted the doctrine in
Murray v. S.C. R.R. Co., 26 S.C.L. (1 McMul.) 385 (1841). More importantly, the great
Massachusetts Chief Justice, Lemuel Shaw, adopted the rule in Farwell v. Boston & Worcester
R.R. Corp., 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49 (1842). For a discussion of the early American application
of this case see LEONARD W. LEVY, THE LAW OF THE COMMONWEALTH AND CHIEF JUSTICE
SHAW 166–82 (1957).
13
Jerrilyn G. Marston, Comment, The Creation of a Common Law Rule: The Fellow Servant
Rule, 1837–1860, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 579, 579 (1984) (“By 1880 the [fellow servant] rule . . . was
. . . firmly entrenched in nearly every American jurisdiction . . . .). Southern courts did not
generally apply this rule to slave workers rented by railroads, steamboats, and other
industries. See Paul Finkelman, Slaves as Fellow Servants: Ideology, Law, and Industrialization,
31 AM. J. LEGAL. HIST. 269, 281–304 (1987).
14
21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). See generally LINDSAY G. ROBERTSON, CONQUEST BY LAW:
HOW THE DISCOVERY OF AMERICA DISPOSSESSED INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF THEIR LANDS
(2005).
15
See Briefs for Defendants, Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 569–70 (1823).
11
12
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Vattel, Baron Samuel von Puffendorf, Hugo Grotius, John Locke, and
Baron Montesquieu.16 The theories of the foreign scholars helped bolster
the result in the case. In his opinion, Marshall embraced the doctrine of
discovery,17 which derived from European law. This doctrine allowed
the United States to take land from the Indians at will. Marshall asserted
throughout the opinion that all European nations accepted the doctrine
18
of discovery, and that Americans inherited and adopted the doctrine.
The Chief Justice endorsed “the theory of the British constitution, [that]
all vacant lands are vested in the crown, as representing the nation; and
the exclusive power to grant them is admitted to reside in the crown, as a
19
branch of the royal prerogative.”
Marshall acknowledged that “this
principle was as fully recognized in America as in the Island of Great
20
Britain.”
This doctrine, being entirely based on foreign law, became
21
fundamental to American land law. Marshall asserted that the United
States might take land by treaty or purchase, but would only do so to
avoid conflict and accomplish the land grab smoothly. Using foreign
law, Marshall justified the United States taking the land in any way it
chose.
This case can be seen as the opposite of imposing international
human rights law on the United States. It can be seen as an “anti-human
rights” result; however, the issue here is not the outcome of the case nor
its relationship to human rights per se, but rather to underscore that early
in our history the courts and the legislatures accepted international law
concepts which then could be applied to human rights domestically.
Indeed, in our nation’s first century, foreign law was prominent in
American cases. Database searches of United States Supreme Court
opinions reveal that the Court cited foreign legal sources extensively.22

His full name was Charles-Louis de Secondat, baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu.
See M’Intosh, 21 U.S. at 572.
18
Id. at 572–79.
19
Id. at 595.
20
Id.
21
Id. at 592 (“[T]he principle . . . supposed to be recognized by all European
governments, from the first settlement of America. The absolute ultimate title has been
considered as acquired by discovery, subject only to the Indian title of occupancy, which
title the discoverers possessed the exclusive right of acquiring.”).
22
The material in this section is based on searches conducted in Lexis and Westlaw
databases. These searches probably undercount the use of foreign law because search
results will not include spelling variations of proper names or descriptive references to notnamed authors. For example, my search by proper name for “Vattel,” the great Swiss legal
scholar, did not return results to “Vatel,” general references to his book, The Law of Nations,
or a reference describing Vattel not by name but as “a great European expert on the law of
nations.”
16
17
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The U.S. Supreme Court cited English law about 750 times before 1865.
The Court cited Lord Chief Justice Mansfield about 170 times, the Court
of King’s Bench about 125 times, Sir Edward Coke about 100 times, the
German legal scholar Baron Samuel von Puffendorf more than 12 times,
the Dutch scholar Hugo Grotius about 50 times, and the Dutch scholar
Ulrich Huber and the French philosopher Montesquieu at least 10 times
each. The great Swiss legal scholar Emmerich de Vattel was a central
figure for American jurisprudence, because he wrote extensively on
federalism in his treatise, Law of Nations.23 This book was “[t]ranslated
immediately into English” and “was unrivaled among such treatises in
its influence on the American founders.”24 Before 1865, the Court cited
him at least thirty times while attorneys cited him in their arguments
about seventy times. From 1865 to 1910, the Court cited Vattel thirtythree more times, while lawyers cited him in nearly thirty other cases.25
Sometimes the early Court cited many foreign sources in the same
case. Consider Brown v. United States,26 a case involving the embargo
during the War of 1812 and the seizure of goods aboard a ship. Here,
Chief Justice Marshall cited the French theorist Montesquieu, the Dutch
legal scholar Cornelius van Bynkershoek, the Swiss legal scholar
Emmerich de Vattel, and the English scholar Joseph D. Chitty.27 In his
dissent, Justice Joseph Story cited a long list of English cases, as well as
the German legal scholar Puffendorf, Vattel, Grotius, Bynkershoek, Lord
Chief Justice Mansfield, and other foreign sources.28
During the Civil War, in The Prize Cases,29 the Court considered the
legality of Lincoln’s blockade of Confederate ports. In this uniquely
American case, the Court relied heavily on foreign law. In arguing for
the United States, Richard Henry Dana, Jr. cited a number of British
cases as well as works by Grotius and other international law theorists.30
In his opinion upholding President Lincoln’s power to impose a
See MONSIEUR DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS; OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
NATURE, APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND OF SOVEREIGNS (Joseph
Chitty ed. & trans., 1852) (1785).
24
PETER ONUF & NICHOLAS ONUF, FEDERAL UNION, MODERN WORLD: THE LAW OF
NATIONS IN AN AGE OF REVOLUTIONS 1776–1814, at 11 (1993).
25
See supra note 22. Statistics are based on Westlaw and Lexis databases queries.
Regarding U.S. Reports, searches seriously undercount the use of foreign sources in legal
arguments and briefs first because most briefs and arguments were not published in U.S.
Reports, but also because, as noted supra, search results will not include cases where the
Court cited a book’s title, but not its author, or incorrectly spelled the author’s name.
26
12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814).
27
Id. at 124–25.
28
Id. at 129–50 (Story J., dissenting).
29
67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).
30
Brief for Libellants at 650, 654, The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862).
23
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blockade, and thus enabling the President to prosecute the war effort,
Justice Robert Grier quoted Vattel: “it is very evident that the common
laws of war—those maxims of humanity, moderation, and honor—ought
to be observed by both parties in every civil war.”31 He also cited Lord
Stowell of the British High Court of Admiralty,32 a proclamation by
Queen Victoria of England,33 and the “law of nations” as a general body
of law.34
After the Civil War, the Court considered the use of military courts
to try civilians when the civilian courts were open and functioning. In
the aftermath of the War, lawyers and judges turned to foreign law to
help determine whether the United States could try civilians by military
tribunals or military commissions. In Ex parte Milligan,35 a case that has
implications for the United States in the modern War on Terror36 as well
as modern human rights law, lawyers for Milligan relied heavily on
foreign law and what would have been a version of “human rights law”
at the time. The burden of Milligan’s case was to show, in effect, that it
violated fundamental notions of justice—which would of course include
fundamental human rights—to try a civilian by a military court if there
was a civil alternative available. One of Milligan’s lawyers, the great
David Dudley Field, cited English law, French law, and the writings and
opinions of William Blackstone, Lord Hale, Sir James Mackintosh,
Montesquieu, and the French scholar and student of American society,
Alexis de Tocqueville. All of these citations supported the principle that
the military could not try civilians,37 and that to do so would threaten
fundamental human rights. This is a powerful example of the
application of foreign notions of fundamental rights—the right to a fair
trial by an impartial forum—in American law.
Stressing the importance of foreign law to the United States, one of
Milligan’s other attorneys, Jeremiah S. Black (a former U.S. Attorney
General), declared “England owes more of her freedom, her grandeur,
and her prosperity to [the jury trial], than to all other causes put
The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) at 667.
Id. at 668.
33
Id. at 669.
34
Id. at 670.
35
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
36
See, e.g., Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008) (en banc, per curiam),
vacated, remanded, application [for transfer from military to civilian custody] granted by AlMarri v. Spagone, 129 S. Ct. 1545 (U.S. 2009). The Fourth Circuit opinion discussed at
length “Milligan's teaching—that our Constitution does not permit the Government to
subject civilians within the United States to military jurisdiction.” Id. at 230.
37
See Briefs for Petitioners at 31, 35–39, 47–49, 53–56, 65, Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 2 (1866).
31
32
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together.”38 Black noted that French scholars such as “Montesquieu and
De Tocqueville speak of [the jury trial] with an admiration as rapturous
as Coke and Blackstone.”39 Citing recent European history, he noted
that:
the most enlightened states of continental Europe have
transplanted it into their countries . . . . It was only in
1830 that an interference with it in Belgium provoked a
successful insurrection which permanently divided one
kingdom into two. In the same year, the Revolution of
the Barricades gave the right of trial by jury to every
40
Frenchman.
Here was a former attorney general arguing that the United States
Supreme Court should take note of, and follow, European notions of due
process and the fair administration of justice.
In his opinion for the Court, Justice David Davis similarly cited old
English law, the theories of Lord Brougham and Sir James Mackintosh,
and a famous nineteenth century English case involving the military
court trial of a civilian in the colony of Demerara.41 Justice Davis noted
that Brougham and Mackintosh had “participated in that debate; and
denounced the trial as illegal; because it did not appear that the courts of
law in Demerara could not try offences, and that ‘when the laws can act,
every other mode of punishing supposed crimes is itself an enormous
crime.’”42 This was almost exactly the situation in Milligan’s case. Thus,
the Court found foreign precedent useful and directly on point for
civilian trials after America’s Civil War.43 The Demerara case turned on
the jurisdiction of courts in the British colonies, but the principle from
that case, which Justice Davis accepted, was that a civilian trial was
essential to the preservation of fundamental rights.
III. FOREIGN LAW IN OUR EARLY FEDERAL REPUBLIC
The debate over international human rights law in the United States,
as the previous section shows, should begin with the understanding that
foreign law has always been part of American constitutional law. But it
Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 65.
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id. at 128. The Demerara case, The King v. Rev. John Smith, is discussed in PAUL
FINKELMAN, SLAVERY IN THE COURTROOM 272–77 (1985).
42
Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 128.
43
Both cases are of course relevant to the United States in a post-9-11 World.
38
39
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is also useful to understand that there was a time when “international
law” was a part of American domestic law in a quite different and more
powerful way. Today, with fifty states, the District of Columbia, more
than 500 Indian tribes government by tribal law, federal Indian law, or
both, and Puerto Rico, the United States is a veritable United Nations of
jurisdictions, which can be in conflict with each other in a variety of
ways. Many interstate legal issues today are covered by federal law, but
there are still instances where the states can, or at least try to, treat each
other as foreign nations. 44 While generally treating the laws of other
states with respect, the American states have, sometimes, nevertheless
interacted as though they were separate countries being asked to enforce
the laws of foreign nations.45
Under the pre-Civil War Constitution the states were more likely to
act as independent republics or nations than they are today. As such,
they often related to each other exactly as foreign nations relate to each
other today. This context often forced the Supreme Court to use
international law concepts to settle purely domestic issues between the
states or citizens of the states. These cases did not implicate federal
plenary powers, which was the issue in Johnson v. M’Intosh and The Prize
Cases.
Sometimes these issues were relatively benign and had few
consequences for the nature of the Union or human rights. In Alabama v.

44
See for example the facts surrounding Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005). In
Granholm, plaintiffs challenged Michigan and New York laws that discriminated against
out-of-state wineries in favor of in-state wineries. Id. at 465−66. The laws allowed in-state
wineries to sell directly to consumers but prohibited out-of-state vendors from making
direct sales. Id. at 466. The Court held that both state laws violated the Commerce Clause
and the Twenty-first Amendment. Id. The Court affirmed the “mandate” that “[s]tates
may not enact laws that burden out-of-state producers or shippers simply to give a
competitive advantage to in-state businesses.” Id. at 472. The history of this maxim dates
back to the Framers’ concern that states would not unify and would essentially “Balkanize”
and operate as a group of separate nations. Id. The Court reviewed the historical need to
prevent friction among the states:
This mandate “reflect[s] a central concern of the Framers that was an
immediate reason for calling the Constitutional Convention: the
conviction that in order to succeed, the new Union would have to
avoid the tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had plagued
relations among the Colonies and later among the States under the
Articles of Confederation.”
Id. (citing Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325−26 (1979)).
45
Issues surrounding same sex marriage are likely to be the next major example of this.
The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006), 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006), even if
it is held to be constitutional, is unlikely to eliminate all interstate disputes over the status
of spouses, children, property, taxation, rights of survivorship, and inheritance stemming
from same-sex unions, same-sex marriages, and domestic partnerships.
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Georgia,46 for example, decided on the eve of the Civil War, the Court
determined the location of the boundary between those two states.
Nothing, it would seem, could have been a more distinctly American
legal question than the border of these two states along the
Chattahoochee River. Yet, in order to determine the boundary between
these two states, Justice James Wayne (who was from Georgia) turned to
Grotius, Vattel, and England’s Lord Hale.47 This was surely not the
application of international human rights law to American law, but
rather the application of more general aspects of international law.
However, the general principle seems clear. In the antebellum period,
the Court had no problem using international law to solve what were
purely domestic legal problems.
This understanding of the common use of international law helps us
better understand the role of international law, and human rights law,
when applied to the great problems of slavery and race in antebellum
America. This problem arose out of interstate conflicts over the status of
slaves, free blacks, and white opponents of slavery. This was where
America domestic law intersected with international law and with what
today we could call international human rights law. The antebellum
system of American federalism deeply tied “domestic international law”
to the problematic relationship between human rights and an expansion
of liberty, in one state, and the denial of human rights, and protection of
slavery, in another state.
IV. INTERSTATE CONFLICTS, THEORY, AND RACE IN ANTEBELLUM AMERICA
Antebellum American jurists generally turned to Joseph Story, and
to a lesser extent, James Kent, when confronted with a domestic conflictof-laws issue. In his Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, Story declared
that conflicts issues should be decided by the application of three
interrelated axioms that Story extrapolated from the work of the
seventeenth-century Dutch legal theorist, Ulrich Huber.48 The first
64 U.S. (23 How.) 505 (1859).
Id. at 513.
48
JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, 30 (1834) [hereinafter
STORY, CONFLICT]. Alan Watson has argued that Story actually misread and/or
misunderstood Huber. ALAN WATSON, JOSEPH STORY AND THE COMITY OF ERRORS: A CASE
STUDY IN CONFLICT OF LAWS 18–21 (1992). This is likely for two reasons. First, although an
accomplished scholar, Story may have very well misunderstood or mistranslated Huber,
who wrote in Latin and Dutch. More importantly, much of Story’s scholarship, especially
his work on conflicts and his Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States (1833) was
consciously designed to further his lifelong goal of nationalizing all law in the United
States. On Story’s nationalizing interests, see generally R. KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT
JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY: STATESMAN OF THE OLD REPUBLIC (1985); Paul Finkelman, Story
46
47
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axiom declared the laws of any nation were enforceable “only within the
limits of its own government” and had no binding force “beyond those
limits.”49 Second, Story asserted that “all persons, who are found within
the limits of government, whether their residence is permanent or
temporary, are to be deemed subjects thereof.”50 The third axiom was
the most difficult to apply. It held that all rules “from comity admit, that
the laws of every people in force within its own limits, ought to have the
same force every where, so far as they do not prejudice the power or
rights of other governments, or of their citizens.”51
The critical question was how to determine these limits, especially
for the separate jurisdictions that made up the United States in the
antebellum period. What were the elements of a law or judicial opinion
that made it “prejudice” another jurisdiction? There was no set answer
for this question. How a court responded to such an argument
depended on the philosophical foundations of the political entity, as well
as the ideological assumptions of the judges. Not surprisingly, in the
antebellum era, attitudes towards race and slavery could put the
jurisprudence or laws of one state beyond the pale of acceptability in
another. The most crucial tests of these theories involved slavery and
race.
Story wrote in the wake of the Missouri Crisis and at the very
moment that the abolitionist movement was growing in his home state of
Massachusetts. Slavery was fast becoming the central issue of the era.
Furthermore, new technologies, particularly the steamboat and the
railroad, made the states of the nation seem physically closer because of
easier accessibility, just as northern opposition to slavery and southern
insistence on the positive good of slavery drove a wedge between them.
How should the free states treat slaves who entered their
jurisdictions accompanying their masters on visits or sojourns? How
should the slave states treat slaves who lived or worked in the North,
and under northern law gained their liberty? How should the slave
states treat northern or foreign free blacks who entered their
jurisdictions? The place of comity in domestic international law was
about to move from an abstract theoretical issue to a concrete problem,

Telling on the Supreme Court: Prigg v. Pennsylvania and Justice Joseph Story’s Judicial
Nationalism, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 247; Paul Finkelman, Prigg v. Pennsylvania: Understanding
Justice Story’s Pro-Slavery Nationalism, 2 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 51 (1997). Thus, his version of
Huber may have been a conscious effort to nationalize American law, with the Supreme
Court at the center of all legal controversies.
49
STORY, CONFLICT, supra note 48, at 30.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 29.
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made more complicated by the highly charged emotional issues
surrounding slavery, freedom, and race.
Story understood what was at stake, as he went on to argue52 that the
obligation of comity is an “imperfect obligation, like that of beneficence,
humanity, and charity.”53 Thus, Story found that “[e]very nation must
be the final judge for itself, not only of the nature and extent of the duty,
but of the occasions, on which its exercise may be justly demanded.”54
Among those circumstances where comity would not be required, were
when foreign “laws are deemed oppressive or injurious to the rights or
interests of the inhabitants of the latter, or where the moral character is
questionable, or their provisions impolitic.”55 Story believed that “a
nation ought not to make its own jurisprudence an instrument of
injustice for other nations, or their subjects”56 but the test of injustice
would always be in the courts of the forum state. Indeed, in the end
“every nation must judge for itself”57 when to grant comity.
Story’s position mirrored that of the nation’s other great legal
theorist and treatise writer, Chancellor James Kent of New York. In his
Commentaries on American Law, Kent asserted that the “laws and usages
of one state cannot be permitted to prescribe qualifications for citizens, to
be claimed and exercised in other states, in contravention to their local
policy.”58 A concrete example of this assertion helps explain its meaning.
Under Kent’s theory, a Virginia slave owner could not claim a right to
own a slave in New York by arguing that he had that right under
Virginia law, and that New York had an obligation to extend comity to
Virginia law, and recognize his ownership in a slave. Virginia slave law,
in other words, could not be imposed on New York, “in contravention”
of its “local policy.” Similarly, a free black from New York who could
move about that state without any legal impediments, could not claim
such rights in Virginia.59
Before the Civil War, the slavery controversy could turn in two
directions. A free state might declare that it immediately emancipated
WATSON, supra note 48, at 20–22. Here, Watson argues that Story departs significantly
from Huber’s thesis. Id.
53
STORY, CONFLICT, supra note 48, at 33.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id. at 34.
57
Id.
58
2 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 62 (1827).
59
Free blacks from Northern states might have claimed that under the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the Constitution (U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1) they had a right to
travel to other states, but the southern states simply refused to acknowledge that free
blacks could be citizens of the states, and thus have rights under this clause. Chief Justice
Taney upheld that position in Dred Scott v. Sandford.
52
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slaves voluntarily brought into its jurisdiction; a slave state might claim
the right to incarcerate a visiting free black or to re-enslave a black who
gained liberty though sojourn or transit in a free state.
V. SLAVERY, RACE, AND DOMESTIC CONFLICTS OF LAW:
SLAVES IN FREE STATES
The most complex and important issue of antebellum America was
slavery. It was, as some scholars have called it, the “Nemesis of the
Constitution.”60 Much of antebellum constitutional decision-making
turned on judges’ feelings about slavery. Even in cases that did not
directly concern slavery, such as The Passenger Cases61 or Mayor of New
York v. Miln,62 slavery lurked in the background, affecting the analysis
and decisions of the Justices. 63
The domestic application of human rights principles and
international law to the problem of slavery arose whenever a case
involved a slave who was in a “foreign” jurisdiction. “Foreign,” in this
case, meant a state other than the slave’s, or the master’s, home state.
“Foreign” could also apply if a slave returned to his or her home state,
after being taken to a free state or country. In such cases, race and
concepts of human rights became a significant factor in the development
of American law. As slavery ended in most of the western hemisphere,
the South’s “peculiar institution” became increasingly “peculiar” and
increasingly problematic for lawyers. Meanwhile, American law became
increasingly disconnected from international notions of human rights.
By 1850, slavery had been abolished everywhere in the Western
Hemisphere except Cuba, Puerto Rico, Brazil, and the United States. Yet,
in 1857 Chief Justice Taney held in Dred Scott v. Sandford that slavery was
a protected form of property and that blacks, even if free, could never be
citizens. Clearly, there was a disconnect between the international
community and the United States.
A. Fugitive Slave Cases
These issues arose in cases involving fugitive slaves.
The
Constitution prevented the free states from emancipating fugitive slaves
and guaranteed that masters could recover their escaped slaves in other
HAROLD M. HYMAN & WILLIAM M. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW:
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT, 1835–1875, at 86 (1982).
61
48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849).
62
36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837).
63
See Paul Finkelman, Teaching Slavery in American Constitutional Law, 34 AKRON L. REV.
261 (2000).
60

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 44, No. 3 [2010], Art. 2

792

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

states.64 In this context the U.S. Constitution might be seen as “antihuman rights.” In fact, some abolitionists saw it that way, with William
Lloyd Garrison calling the document “A Covenant with Death and an
Agreement in Hell.”
Whenever a person claimed a black as a fugitive slave, questions of
identification could easily cloud the implementation of this clause. In an
age before photographs, fingerprinting, and DNA, the wrong person
might easily be seized and enslaved. Thus, throughout the North there
were legitimate fears that free blacks might be kidnapped or illegally
claimed as fugitive slaves.
But, even if identification had been perfect, questions of the actual
legal status of an alleged fugitive slave might arise. In 1797, for example,
four blacks living in Pennsylvania petitioned Congress, which was
meeting in Philadelphia at the time, to protect their freedom. They
claimed their North Carolina masters manumitted them and that the
Superior Court of North Carolina confirmed their freedom. However, a
state statute threatened their liberty by retroactively65 voiding all
manumissions, except for “meritorious service.”66 Were these blacks
slaves who owed service or labor in North Carolina? Or, were they free
people in danger of being kidnapped by greedy heirs or creditors of their
former masters? The situation of these blacks illustrates the complexity
of determining who might be a fugitive slave.
The two most significant fugitive slave cases to reach the U.S.
Supreme Court—Prigg v. Pennsylvania67 and Jones v. Van Zandt68—
involved issues of status, identity, and race. These cases illustrated how
race and human rights claims became a central issue in determining
whether the law of the free states or that of the slave states would set the
standard in American jurisprudence. Significantly, in both cases the
Supreme Court adopted a jurisprudence which simply assumed that
blackness was equivalent to slavery. A brief examination of the cases
illustrates this.

U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
The U.S. Constitution prohibits the states from passing “ex post facto law.” U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10. But the ban on ex post facto laws narrowly applied to criminal matters.
A statute declaring manumissions to be void would not be a criminal law, and thus would
not be prohibited by the ban on ex post facto laws.
66
DONALD F. ROBINSON, SLAVERY IN THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICS, 1765-1820
288–89 (1971).
67
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842). On the history of this case, see Finkelman, Story Telling on
the Supreme Court, supra note 48; Paul Finkelman, Sorting Out Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 24
RUTGERS L.J. 605 (1993); Paul Finkelman, Prigg v. Pennsylvania and Northern State Courts:
Anti-Slavery Use of a Pro-Slavery Decision, 25 CIV. WAR HIST. 5 (1979).
68
46 U.S. (5 How.) 215 (1847).
64
65
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Prigg began when Nathan S. Bemis, Edward Prigg, and two other
Marylanders seized a black woman, Margaret Morgan, and her children,
and took them from York County, Pennsylvania to Harford County,
Maryland as fugitive slaves.69 Bemis’s mother-in-law claimed that
Morgan was her slave and that she escaped to Pennsylvania. Prigg et al.
took Morgan and her children to Maryland without first obtaining a
certificate of removal from a Pennsylvania judge, as required by
Pennsylvania’s personal liberty law of 1826.70
The Marylanders initially tried to comply with the Pennsylvania law.
Before seizing Morgan they went to a local justice of the peace, Thomas
Henderson, and obtained a warrant, as required by the Pennsylvania law
of 1826. A local constable then accompanied the four Marylanders to the
Morgan home, arrested the family, and brought them back to Justice of
the Peace Henderson. Henderson, however, refused to grant a certificate
of removal to take the Morgans back to Maryland. Jerry Morgan,
Margaret’s husband, was clearly a freeborn native of Pennsylvania, and
Margaret gave birth to one or more of her children in that free state as
well, and under Pennsylvania law, the children were also free.71
Furthermore, Margaret Morgan had never been claimed as a slave in
Maryland, nor treated like one. Indeed, the 1830 census, taken while the
Morgans were still present in Maryland, listed Margaret and her children
as free blacks.72 Significantly, the county sheriff gathered this census
data. Although we cannot be certain, Morgan probably explained the
circumstances of her life to Henderson, who then released the Morgans
from custody.
Bemis, Prigg, and the other two men then seized Margaret Morgan
and her children (but not her free-born husband), and took them to
Maryland, where eventually they were sold to a slave trader and
removed from the state. York County indicted all four men for
kidnapping, and the governor of Pennsylvania sought their extradition.
Initially, Maryland’s governor stonewalled on returning any of the
See Finkelman, Story Telling on the Supreme Court, supra note 48, at 252.
Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 550–56. The personal liberty law was entitled, “An act to
give effect to the provisions of the constitution of the United States relative to fugitives
from labor, for the protection of free people of color, and to prevent kidnapping.” Id. at
550. A number of northern states passed “personal liberty laws” to prevent the kidnapping
of free blacks by requiring an inquiry by a state judicial officer before a black could be
removed from the state as a fugitive slave. See generally THOMAS D. MORRIS, FREE MEN ALL:
THE PERSONAL LIBERTY LAWS OF THE NORTH 1780–1861 (1974).
71
The 1830 census provides information on how many children Morgan had while
living in Maryland; we know she had at least two more when taken out of Pennsylvania.
One or both were born in Pennsylvania. U.S. CENSUS, MANUSCRIPT CENSUS FOR HARFORD
COUNTY, MARYLAND 394 (1830).
72
Id.
69
70
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Bemis party to Pennsylvania for trial. However, after protracted
negotiations, Maryland authorities returned Prigg (but no one else) to
Pennsylvania for trial. An agreement between the two states set the
stage for the extradition and Prigg’s trial.73 This agreement included a
promise that Pennsylvania would not incarcerate the alleged kidnapper
until after he exhausted all appeals and that there would be an expedited
appeal through the Pennsylvania courts.74 In the Opinion of the Court,
Justice Joseph Story praised both states for their cooperation in this
matter when the case reached the U.S. Supreme Court.75
This agreement illustrates one aspect of human rights law and the
domestic international law of race. Pennsylvania was eager to protect its
free blacks—like Jerry Morgan and his freeborn children—from being
kidnapped. Maryland, on the other hand, wanted to eliminate free state
interference with the rendition of fugitive slaves. Maryland also did not
want its citizens incarcerated for kidnapping when they were exercising
what they believed to be a constitutional right to recover fugitive slaves.
In the context of human rights, Pennsylvania wanted to protect the
liberty of its residents while Maryland wanted to protect the property
claims of its residents. This agreement was much like a treaty between
sovereign nations. Emissaries from the governor of Pennsylvania
worked out the details of the agreement with men appointed by the
Maryland governor.
The legislatures of both states ratified the
agreement, much as national legislatures might ratify a treaty. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court willingly participated, giving a speedy
review of Prigg’s conviction. In upholding the conviction, the Court did
not write an opinion in the case, perhaps because that would have
slowed down the process. The Court may also have felt that such an
opinion would have complicated the appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.
With no opinion to respond to, the U.S. Supreme Court crafted its own
solution to the problem raised by Pennsylvania’s personal liberty law
and Prigg’s behavior.
In his opinion of the Court, Justice Joseph Story callously ignored the
facts of the case. Importantly, he refused to consider whether Morgan
was ever actually a slave or whether she ever “escaped” from slavery.
He noted that some of her children had been born in Pennsylvania, but
did not offer any analysis of how that fact might affect their status. In

73
We have no evidence of why Prigg was extradited, rather than Bemis, although it is
possible that Bemis’s higher social status as a lawyer and an important property owner
protected him.
74
For case details, see Finkelman, Story Telling on the Supreme Court, supra note 48.
75
Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539. For a discussion and details of this case, see Finkelman,
Story Telling on the Supreme Court, supra note 48.
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effect, Story refused to consider the human rights laws of Pennsylvania,
which provided that all people born in that state were born free and
could not be enslaved. The choice of law here was to favor the property
rights law of Maryland over the human rights law of Pennsylvania.76
Instead, Story focused on the importance of the fugitive slave clause,
and the 1793 federal fugitive slave law, for promoting sectional
harmony. In doing this, Story held that masters had the right to take
fugitive slaves back to the South without any legal process or judicial
superintendence, as long as this could be accomplished without a
“breach of the peace.” This in effect was a green light to kidnappers,
who could now seize any blacks in the North because no state official
could interfere with the return of a fugitive slave. The opinion made
race the sole criterion for determining who might be seized and taken to
the South without any due process. After Prigg, if he could act without
an obvious breach of the peace, any southerner could seize any black
person in the North, and take him or her to the South, without any
interference from Northern authorities. This made all blacks living near
the South—in the southern parts of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Ohio,
Indiana, and Illinois, as well as those living in port cities such as Boston
or New York—vulnerable to seizure and a quick removal to a slave state,
before they could make their plight known to any neighbors.
Story’s replacement on the Court, Levi Woodbury, took this
racialization of American law one step further in Jones v. Van Zandt.77 In
the process, Woodbury added to what might be called the “anti-human
rights” law of the United States, by in effect holding that all blacks, even
those in a free state, should be presumed to be slaves.
The case began when a group of slaves escaped into Ohio from a
Kentucky slaveowner named Wharton Jones. In Ohio, just outside of
Cincinnati, a farmer named John Van Zandt offered a ride in his wagon
to this group of blacks walking along the road. Van Zandt later claimed
that in Ohio all people were presumed free, and thus he committed no
crime or civil wrong when he offered a ride to these strangers. In fact, all
of these people were slaves, owned by Jones. Jones did not take any
immediate action to recover the slaves, but a party of freelance
slavecatchers heard that Jones’s slaves had escaped, and crossed into
Ohio to find them. The slavecatchers tried to stop Van Zandt’s wagon,
but he refused to halt when these unknown and unidentified
76
Story might have compromised here, and declared that the children of Morgan, born
in Pennsylvania, were free and thus Prigg was legitimately convicted for their kidnapping
but this would have muddied the waters and prevent Story from writing the emphatically
proslavery opinion he seemed bent on writing.
77
46 U.S. (5 How.) 215 (1847).
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southerners, with no legal process in hand, accosted him. Eventually
they stopped the wagon and in the ensuing chaos one of the slaves
evaded capture and was never returned to Jones. Van Zandt had no
legal notice that the people in his wagon were fugitive slaves and
essentially argued that in the free state of Ohio all people were
presumptively free. Then he claimed he had no legal obligation to
respond to this group of armed ruffians who chased him.
Speaking for the Court, Woodbury held that Van Zandt was liable
for the value of the lost slave because he did not need written notice nor
specific notice from the owner that the people in his wagon were slaves.
The fact that a group of armed, unknown men from another state—
freelance slave catchers—tried to stop his wagon made no difference.
Just as Story ignored the free state birth of some of Margaret Morgan’s
children, Woodbury ignored the illegal violence of self-deputized armed
ruffians stopping a wagon peacefully traveling down an Ohio road. The
law of the United States was now clear: all people—North and South—
should assume that any black they encountered was a runaway slave. In
Dred Scott v. Sandford78 Chief Justice Taney would hold that free blacks
had no rights under the Constitution. While stated clearly and starkly,
Taney’s anti-human rights analysis in that case was in many ways just an
expansion of the doctrine created in Jones by Justice Woodbury.
Woodbury asserted that any information that would “satisfy a fairminded man that he is concealing the property of another” was sufficient
to sustain a civil action for harboring a fugitive slave.79 While not
directly stating it, Woodbury’s assumptions were clear: Van Zandt
should have assumed that a group of blacks walking along a road in
southern Ohio were, or might be, fugitive slaves. He should further
have assumed that any white man with a southern accent had a
legitimate reason to stop his wagon to search it for fugitive slaves. Race
was sufficient to justify the suspicion that even in a free state all blacks
were likely to be runaway slaves. Race was similarly sufficient to allow
a search by people who were not even officers of the law. This case may
be the first example of the Supreme Court upholding a profile search
based on race.
Taken together, Prigg and Van Zandt in effect held that in any choiceof-law situation involving race, the court should ignore the free state law
in favor of the law of the slave states. If this were true, then the common
presumption of the South, that race determined status, would become
the law of the nation. The domestic international law, under these cases,

78
79
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rejected the human rights claims of blacks, but firmly supported the
property rights claims of southerners.
B. Slaves in Transit in Free Jurisdictions
Somerset v. Stewart80 was the first major Anglo-American case
involving international law concepts and slavery.81 James Somerset was
the slave of Charles Stewart, a minor colonial official who lived in
Virginia. Stewart took Somerset to England in 1769 and held him as a
slave until he escaped in 1771. Stewart hired men who captured
Somerset and placed him on board a ship destined for Jamaica, where he
was to be sold as a slave. British opponents of slavery, led by Granville
Sharp, obtained a writ of habeas corpus to bring Somerset before Chief
Justice Lord Mansfield of the Court of King's Bench.
At stake in this case was the status of some 15,000 slaves then living
in England. Lord Mansfield tried to avoid the issue and urged the
parties to settle the case so he would not have to reach a decision. He
suggested Mr. Stewart “end the question, by discharging or giving
freedom to the negro.”82 But, in fact, there was little room for settlement.
Somerset would take nothing less than his liberty; for Stewart,
emancipating Somerset was hardly a settlement—it was a total loss.83
Mansfield was uncomfortable with the potential consequences of the
case, admitting that “setting 14,000 or 15,000 men at once free loose by a
solemn opinion, is much disagreeable.”84 But, Mansfield enforced the
law, no matter what the cost: “fiat justitia, ruat coelum” he told the
lawyers for both sides85—let justice be done, though the heavens may
fall!
In deciding the case, Mansfield noted that “Contract for sale of a
slave is good here; the sale is a matter to which the law properly and
readily attaches, and will maintain the price according to the agreement.
But here the person of the slave himself is immediately the object of
Somerset v. Stewart, (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B.).
See generally DAVID BRION DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF
REVOLUTION 1770–1823, at 469–522 (1975); PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION:
SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, AND COMITY (1981, reprint 2001); William M. Wiecek, Somerset: Lord
Mansfield and the Legitimacy of Slavery in the Anglo-American World, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 86
(1974).
82
He similarly suggested that the “merchants” who thought the case was “of great
commercial concern” should take the issue to Parliament. Somerset, 98 Eng. Rep. at 509.
83
It is not impossible to imagine some compromise, in which Somerset agreed to work
for Stewart as an indentured servant for a set term, in exchange for his absolute freedom,
but neither side seemed interested in such a result.
84
Somerset, 98 Eng. Rep. at 509.
85
Id.
80
81
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enquiry; which makes a very material difference.”86 This is important,
because in effect Mansfield acknowledged that international law
recognized slavery and accepted the system, and that for purposes of
international commerce, Britain did too. Thus, in 1772, rather than there
being an international human rights law, there was an international antihuman rights law that acknowledged and recognized trafficking in
human beings. Mansfield did not reject this rule of law for international
transactions, but for domestic litigation—when “the person of the slave
himself” was in Great Britain—he chose to develop a domestic (British)
human rights law that prohibited slavery.
In the end, Mansfield issued a narrow opinion. He would not
consider the status of all slaves in England; he was not prepared to issue
an emancipation proclamation for all of Britain. He simply held that
Stewart had no grounds to hold Somerset against his will. Stewart’s
“return” of the writ of habeas corpus stated “that the slave departed and
refused to serve; whereupon he was kept, to be sold abroad.”87 This was
beyond what English law could tolerate, and went directly to the issue of
international law: “So high an act of dominion must be recognized by
the law of the country where it is used.”88 Was there such a “law” in
England? Clearly there was not, for:
[t]he state of slavery is of such a nature, that it is
incapable of being introduced on any reasons, moral or
political; but only positive law, which preserves its force
long after the reason, occasion, and time itself from
whence it was created, is erased from memory: it’s so
odious, that nothing can be suffered to support it, but
positive law.89
Thus, the court released Somerset. Implicitly, any slave taken to any
common law jurisdiction that did not have slavery would be equally
entitled to liberty.
This was what Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw of Massachusetts
concluded in Commonwealth v. Aves90 six decades later. Like Somerset,
this was a case brought by opponents of slavery—this time the Boston
Female Anti-Slavery Society—to secure the freedom of a slave visiting in
a free jurisdiction. The case involved Med, a six-year-old slave girl

86
87
88
89
90
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brought to Boston by Mary Aves Slater, when she returned from New
Orleans, Louisiana to visit her father, Thomas Aves.
The case was relatively easy for Chief Justice Shaw to decide.91 Shaw
was surprised that it was a case of first impression for a Massachusetts
judge. But he was firm in concluding that slavery was illegal in
Massachusetts, and no one could be held a slave in that state, except a
fugitive who escaped into Massachusetts and whose slave status was
preserved by the U.S. Constitution. Clearly, Med was not such a person.
The only difficult question for Shaw was whether some theory of
international law, modified and strengthened by the national union and
the U.S. Constitution, required Massachusetts to recognize the status of
“slave” conferred on Med by Louisiana law. Shaw noted that slavery
was clearly “contrary to natural right, to the principles of justice,
humanity and sound policy,” but Shaw admitted that slavery was
certainly not “contrary to the law of nations.”92 He could have hardly
done otherwise in a nation whose Constitution seemed proslavery to
many Americans,93 clearly protected the rights of masters to recover
fugitive slaves in the free states,94 and counted slaves for purposes of
allocating representation in the national Congress.95 He even admitted
that under the theory of “lex loci contractus” he would uphold a claim
under a contract for the sale of slaves if the contract had been made in
New Orleans. The legal theory of this was obvious. Any court should
enforce a contract if “the contract was a legal one by the law of the place
where it was made.”96 Like Lord Mansfield in Somerset, he did not find
slavery contrary to international law. If there was an international
human rights law, it did not affect the status of a slave. Shaw also
acknowledged that under general notions of international law, personal
property acquired in one place “by the comity of nations the same must
be deemed his property everywhere.”97 But, he would not accept such a
law for the person of a slave. The theory of personal property adhering
to the owner could apply “only to those commodities which are
everywhere, and by all nations, treated and deemed subjects of
91
See FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION, supra note 81, at 101–25; LEVY, supra note 12, at
101–125.
92
Aves, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) at 215.
93
See PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE FOUNDERS: RACE AND LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF
JEFFERSON 3 (2d ed. 2001), for the proslavery nature of the U.S. Constitution.
94
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
95
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
96
Aves, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) at 215. Lord Mansfield reached the same conclusions in
Somerset, noting that a contract for sale of a slave in the American colonies would be
upheld in England. See Jonathan A. Bush, The British Constitution and the Creation of
American Slavery, in SLAVERY & THE LAW 379 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1997).
97
Aves, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) at 216.
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property.”98 Otherwise, “the law of slavery must extend to every place
where such slaves may be carried.”99
Thus, Shaw found that comity did not require Massachusetts to
recognize the status of a slave that a foreign law created. Med was free,
not because the law of Massachusetts made her free, but because the law
of Louisiana ceased to have any force over her once her master
voluntarily removed her from that state. The status of slave could only
be maintained under positive law, and no such law was available to
Med’s owner in Massachusetts. As in Somerset, this was a decision in
which local human rights law trumped international law principles that
denied the liberty to slaves and generally allowed people to move their
property (including slaves) from one jurisdiction to another.
Most other northern states followed Shaw’s lead in this area.100
More importantly, the states accepted the notion that any black traveling
with a white might be treated as a slave and thus in need of help from
the legal system. From the mid-1830s until the beginning of the Civil
War, white and black abolitionists often intervened to secure the
freedom of slaves brought into the North. Just as southern whites
frequently stopped blacks traveling alone on the suspicion that they
were fugitive slaves, northerners stopped southern whites traveling with
blacks on the suspicion they might be bringing slaves into the free states.
In 1839 whites in Holden, Massachusetts intervened on behalf of
Anne, a thirteen-year-old black girl they suspected of being a slave. Mrs.
Olivia Eames, a native of Massachusetts, who lived in New Orleans,
brought Anne to the Bay State when she returned home. Eames’s failure
to send Anne to school, and of her generally harsh treatment of Anne
troubled concerned neighbors. These neighbors feared Eames would
eventually take Anne back to New Orleans and sell her. A county court
ruled that Anne was free and forced Eames to pay nominal damages to
Anne for illegally holding her in servitude.101
Similar cases occurred in Connecticut, Pennsylvania, and Ohio, as
northerners asserted the presumption that visiting blacks might be
illegally treated as slaves, and thus should be freed.102 These cases might
be seen as profile stops in reverse. If a white was traveling in the North
with a black, this alone was cause to stop the white on suspicion of
Id.
Id.
100
See FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION, supra note 81, for a general discussion and
analysis of the many slave transit cases that reached northern courts.
101
HOLDEN ANTI-SLAVERY SOCIETY, REPORT OF THE HOLDEN SLAVE CASE TRIED AT THE
COURT OF COMMON PLEAS FOR THE COUNTY OF WORCESTER (1839), reprinted in 2 SOUTHERN
SLAVES IN FREE STATE COURTS: THE PAMPHLET LITERATURE 41 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1988).
102
See generally FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION, supra note 81.
98
99
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bringing a slave into a free state. This jurisprudence applied a domestic
law of human rights in the face of international concepts of comity and
property that might have supported slavery.
Two cases in New York illustrate the importance of using race as a
criterion for intervention in the late antebellum period and the
application of state human rights law to domestic international law. In
1846, a Georgia sea captain discovered a slave named George Kirk
hidden on his ship as he headed for New York. Unwilling to return to
Savannah, the captain put Kirk in irons and planned to take him back to
Georgia after he docked in New York and unloaded his cargo. A black
stevedore, named Lewis Napoleon, noticed the man in chains, and
immediately secured a writ of habeas corpus. The ship captain claimed
that Kirk was a fugitive slave and that he therefore had a right to take
him back to Georgia. But, the fugitive slave law only applied to slaves
escaping into a state. Kirk did not do this; rather the captain brought him
into New York. This meant Kirk was free.103
Six years later the same Lewis Napoleon (or as he now spelled it,
Louis Napoleon), gained the release of eight slaves that a Virginia family
brought into the state as they changed ships in New York City while
traveling from Virginia to Texas. While geographically out of the way,
the fastest route from Virginia to Texas was in fact to take a ship to New
York and then a direct steamer to New Orleans.104
This case began in 1852, but did not reach New York’s highest court
until 1860. The court in Lemmon v. The People105 ruled that New York had
an absolute right to immediately free any slave brought into the state.
This case was a minor cause célèbre at the time.106 Had the Civil War not
intervened, this case might very well have reached the Supreme Court,
which would have probably upheld the right of slave transit, and thus
given a final decision on the requirement of comity for slave owners.107
In liberating visiting slaves, Britain and the northern states in effect
applied their own human rights laws to the status of visitors, despite the
fact that there was legitimate international law precedent and theory for
concluding that a state should accept the personal status of visitors from
other places. Free jurisdictions usually accepted foreign law involving
marriage, divorce, child custody, apprenticeship, and other aspects of
personal status as well as foreign laws creating property and contract
relations.
This was all consistent with recognized concepts of
103
104
105
106
107

In re Kirk, 1 Edm. Sel. Cas. 315 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1846).
Lemmon v. The People, 20 N.Y. 562 (1860).
Id.
See FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION, supra note 81, at 296–312.
Id. at 313–38.
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international law. It would certainly have been reasonable, within
generally understood notions of international laws on property and
personal status, to have recognized the status of visiting slaves. Instead,
these free jurisdictions applied their own human rights law to trump
international law, which did not recognize human rights but did
recognize property rights in slaves.
VI. SLAVERY, RACE, AND DOMESTIC CONFLICTS OF LAW:
FREE BLACKS IN SLAVE STATES
A corollary to the problem of slaves entering the North arose when
free blacks traveled to slave states or when slaves, who had lived in free
states, returned to slave jurisdictions, either on their own initiative or
because a master forced such a return.
There is only one major case on free blacks entering the South.108
However, the issue led to tense relations between northern and southern
states, and is a good example of how issues of international law and
constitutional law are not always resolved in the courts. This issue is
also the “purest” antebellum example of race and human rights concerns
intersecting with domestic international law. Prohibitions on free blacks
entering the southern states were entirely based on race. These
prohibitions also flew in the face of the privileges and immunities clause
of the Constitution as well as all notions of international comity. The
same laws also applied to black citizens of the British Empire. Thus race
undermined American foreign policy and prevented the U.S. from fully
applying accepted concepts of international law to its foreign policy.
These laws also rejected international law by refusing to acknowledge
the status of visiting blacks, who were free in places where they lived. In
this sense, the southern states substituted their own anti-human rights
law for international law that would have protected the human rights of
free blacks.
In contrast to the single southern federal case involving a free black
entering the South, many southern states heard cases involving the
status of slaves who had been taken to a free jurisdiction and then
returned to a slave state. In all of those cases, race and color were at
issue, and in some, race became the central issue. Two of these cases,
Strader v. Graham109 and Dred Scott v. Sandford,110 reached the United
States Supreme Court. By the late 1850s, cases on this issue had also
108
Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 F. Cas. 493 (C.C.D.S.C. 1823) (No. 4,366). For a discussion of
Elkison, see infra notes 134–43 and accompanying text.
109
51 U.S. (10 How.) 82 (1850).
110
60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). See PAUL FINKELMAN, DRED SCOTT V. SANDFORD: A BRIEF
HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS (1997).
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become racialized. At issue was not simply someone’s status as a slave
or free person, but rather the status of an entire race.
A. State Regulation of the Ingress of Slaves
Nations usually have great discretion as to whom they let into their
jurisdictions.111 While international travel is common today, it still often
requires passports, visas, proof of identity, proof of financial status, and
even background checks. Even in a federal republic, it would be possible
for one state to bar the admission of people from other states. The
United States Constitution, at least in theory, eliminated this problem in
two ways. First, it gave Congress plenary power over all matters
relating to commerce among the states. Thus, only Congress can
regulate the interstate movement of people. Second, the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the Constitution112 presumably meant that every
state had to treat the citizens of every other state with dignity and
respect.
Complicating these provisions, however, was the slave trade
provision of Article I, which declared that:
“The Migration or
Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think
proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year
one thousand eight hundred and eight.”113
A plain reading of this clause suggests that before 1808 the states
could permit or exclude the “migration or importation” of “Such
Persons” at their discretion, and that after 1808, Congress could also
exclude such people. The slave trade inspired the drafting of the clause
111
Although beyond the scope of this article, it is worth noting that the United States has
historically used race as a component of its naturalization and immigration laws. Before
the Civil War, naturalization was available only to “whites.” After the Civil War,
naturalization expanded to people of African ancestry. In Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S.
178 (1922) and United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1923), the United States Supreme Court
held that under this law people from East and South Asia could not be naturalized. The
first restriction on immigration was the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, which was directed
at a specific racial/ethnic group. Subsequent immigration laws severely limited, or
absolutely banned, non-whites from immigrating to the United States. The precedents
upholding and interpreting these laws are still valid, and according to Gabriel J. Chin, are
the last vestiges of legalization of race discrimination in federal law. See Gabriel J. Chin,
Segregation’s Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46
UCLA L. REV. 1, 6, 12–15 (1998) (noting that the right to naturalized citizenship was
restricted by race from 1790 to 1952, the right to immigrate was restricted by race from 1882
to 1965, and federal decisions still permit racial discrimination by Congress). For a
discussion of the informal and then formal restriction on Japanese immigration, which
were also based on race, see Paul Finkelman, Race, Federalism, and Diplomacy: The
Gentlemen's Agreement a Century Later, 56 OSAKA [JAPAN] UNIV. L. REV. 1−30 (2009).
112
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
113
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, c1. 1.
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and allowed the states to continue the trade until at least 1808. Implicit
in the clause, however, is that after 1808, if Congress chose not to end the
African slave trade, the states were still free to “admit or exclude” slaves
on their own.
Could the same be said for other “Persons” as well? Surely it
applied to slaves other than those from Africa. Surely a state had a right
to declare that no one could be a slave within its jurisdiction. Likewise, a
state could prevent someone from bringing new slaves into its
jurisdiction. This, in any event, was what the states must have thought
when they ratified the Constitution. At the time, Pennsylvania,
Connecticut, and Rhode Island banned the importation of any new
slaves and freed the slaves of visiting masters. Pennsylvania’s gradual
Abolition Act of 1780 allowed visiting masters to keep their slaves in the
state for up to six months. The law also exempted members of Congress
and diplomats from the six months rule as long as they held their
office.114 However, the implication of this law was that the state had the
power to free the slaves of visitors the moment they were brought into
the state. No one at the Constitutional Convention, in any of the state
ratifying conventions, or in any of the public debates over ratification
ever expressed a fear that the new frame of government would bar such
regulation.
In Groves v. Slaughter,115 the Supreme Court affirmed the right of the
states to exclude slaves as merchandise. The case involved a civil suit
based on the refusal of Groves to pay on a note he had given Slaughter
for the purchase of slaves that Slaughter brought to Mississippi. Groves
argued the sale was void because Mississippi’s 1832 Constitution banned
the importation of slaves as merchandise. The Court held in favor of
Slaughter on the grounds that the 1832 Constitution was not selfexecuting, and that Mississippi needed to pass legislation to ban the
importation of slaves as merchandise. But the Court clearly believed the
states had the right and the power to prohibit the introduction of slaves
as merchandise.
However, the Justices could not agree on why Mississippi could ban
the sale of slaves. Justice McLean asserted that congressional commerce
power precluded the states from banning any form of merchandise.
However, McLean argued slaves were not merchandise, but people, and
thus could be banned. McLean, the only real opponent of slavery on the
Court,116 wanted to make sure that slavery was a local institution. Thus,
An Act for the Gradual Abolition of Slavery, PA. STAT. AT LARGE, §881 (1780).
40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449 (1841).
116
On McLean and antislavery, see Paul Finkleman, John McLean: Moderate Abolitionist
and Supreme Court Politician, 62 VAND. L. REV. 519–65 (2009).
114
115
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he argued that “[t]he power over slavery belongs to the states
respectively. It is local in its character, and in its effects; and the transfer
or sale of slaves cannot be separated from this power. It is, indeed, an
essential part of it.”117 He further argued that the right to exclude slaves
was “higher and deeper than the Constitution” because the inherent evil
of slavery “involves the prosperity, and may endanger the existence of a
state.”118 The power rested on “the law of self-preservation; a law vital
to every community, and especially to a sovereign state.”119
The problem with this analysis, of course, is that it could also cut in
the opposite direction. If the outcome rested on the power of a state to
exclude “persons,” then a slave state could argue that free blacks were a
threat and should be excluded. A slave state might even argue that
abolitionist whites should also be excluded.
Chief Justice Roger B. Taney concurred in the result of this case by
arguing for a classic states rights position that any power of the states to
regulate slavery could not “be controlled by congress, either by virtue of
its power to regulate commerce, or by virtue of any power conferred by
the constitution of the United States.”120 Taney was emphatic that the
regulation of slavery lay “exclusively with the several states; and each of
them has a right to decide for itself, whether it will, or will not, allow
persons of this description to be brought within its limits, from another
state, either for sale, or for any other purpose.”121
Neither McLean nor Taney offered an analysis that was completely
coherent or wholly useful for either of their agendas. Under McLean’s
theory, a slave state might refuse to allow a free black, or even a white
abolitionist, to enter its domain. This was not something that McLean
would have wanted. Under Taney’s theory, on the other hand, a free
state could prevent any master from traveling with a slave in or through
its jurisdiction. Although Taney never actually faced such a case while
on the Court, had he done so he would have likely upheld the right of a
master to travel through a free state with his slaves. This would have
been consistent with his proslavery jurisprudence122 and foreshadowed

Id. at 508.
Id.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
See Paul Finkelman, “Hooted Down the Page of History”: Reconsidering the Greatness of
Chief Justice Taney, 19 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 83 (1994).
117
118
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the concurring opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford by Justice Samuel
Nelson.123
Taney’s position also comports with his concurring opinion in Prigg
v. Pennsylvania124 the following year. There Taney argued that the
federal government had plenary power over the regulation of the return
of fugitive slaves, and even argued that the national government had the
power to require the states to help in the return of fugitive slaves. Thus,
in fact Taney believed the regulation of slavery lay “exclusively with the
several states”125 only to the extent that the states protected slavery.
When necessary, Taney appeared to be willing to allow the federal
government to regulate slavery in order to protect a master’s interest in
his slave property.
Yet, despite Chief Justice Taney’s mixed messages on the power of
the states to regulate slavery, the Constitution clearly seemed to require
that people be able to move from place to place without state
interference. Passports, visas, and even identification papers would
seem to be an unconstitutional burden on interstate movement. Indeed,
the right to move from state to state seemed to be a fundamental purpose
of the Constitution and a basic aspect of domestic human rights at this
time. If there was to be any regulation of this movement, Congress,
through its commerce power, would be the body to make such
regulations. But, slavery and race undermined the chances of this
smoothly happening.
B. Free Blacks Entering the Slave South
Why would any African American even want to enter the slave
South? The concept seems chilling. But, for business or pleasure, free
blacks did have an occasion to do so. Some free blacks in the North had
enslaved relatives and went south to visit them. Other blacks came as
part of their work. In New England a large population of black men
were merchant seamen whose ships often called on southern ports.
Southern fears of free blacks were not totally unfounded. Some
blacks returned to the South with more than mere visits in mind. Harriet
Tubman126 made numerous forays into the South to help relatives and
other slaves escape from bondage. Dangerfield Newby, one of John
Brown’s raiders, hoped to rescue his wife from bondage. After Newby
123
Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 454 (1857) (Wayne, J.; Nelson, J.; Grier, J.; Daniel,
J.; Campbell, J., Catron, J., concurring). For further development of this argument, see
FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION, supra note 81, at 313–38.
124
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
125
Groves, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) at 508.
126
Tubman was technically a fugitive slave, but she acted as a free person.
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died in the raid, a Louisiana slave trader bought his wife.127 The case of
Kentucky v. Dennison emerged out of the attempts of Kentucky to obtain
custody of Willis Lago, a free black from Ohio who had gone into
Kentucky and helped a slave woman escape to Cincinnati.128 Even
casual black visitors to the South could undermine slavery. Frederick
Douglass escaped from bondage carrying identification papers lent to
him by a free black sailor from the North.129
Ever fearful of free blacks, especially from the outside, most
southern states prohibited them from entering their domains. Between
1820 and 1860 every southern coastal state, except Mississippi,130 passed
a law regulating black sailors who entered their ports. The non-coastal
states also prohibited free blacks from other states from entering their
jurisdictions. Kentucky’s 1850 Constitution, for example, directed the
general assembly to pass legislation making it a felony for free blacks to
move into the state.131 A brief look at the South Carolina experience
illustrates the problem.
In 1800, South Carolina prohibited free blacks from entering the
state.132 This was the first of many such laws on this subject. In 1820
South Carolina prohibited all manumissions within the state and
reiterated its prohibition on any free blacks entering the state.133 South
Carolina’s laws provided for free blacks entering the state to be
incarcerated or sold for a short period of time. If these free blacks
persisted in living in the state, they could eventually be sold into lifetime
slavery.
In the 1820s South Carolina passed laws, known as the “Negro
Seamen’s Acts,” restricting free black sailors from entering the state.134
STEPHEN B. OATES, TO PURGE THIS LAND WITH BLOOD: A BIOGRAPHY OF JOHN BROWN
316 (1970).
128
65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1860).
129
FREDERICK DOUGLAS, LIFE AND TIMES OF FREDERICK DOUGLAS (1892).
130
By the late antebellum period, North Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Louisiana,
and Texas required the immediate imprisonment of black sailors entering those states.
Virginia restricted their movement and allowed for their enslavement if they remained in
the state. Lacking a major port, Mississippi did not pass any specific law dealing with
black seamen, but restricted the movement of all free blacks in the state and prohibited free
blacks from entering the state.
131
KY. CONST. of 1850, art. X, § 2.
132
“AN ACT for the better regulation and government of Free Negroes and Persons of
Color; and for other purposes,” 7 Stat. S.C. 461 (1822).
133
”AN ACT to restrain the emancipation of Slaves, and to prevent Free persons of Color
from entering into this State; and for other purposes,” 7 Stat. S.C. 459 (1820).
134
See “AN ACT for the better regulation and government of Free Negroes and Persons
of Color; and for other purposes,” 7 Stat. S.C. 461 (1822). See also subsequent acts of a
similar nature: “AN ACT more effectually to prevent Free Negroes and other Persons of
Color from entering into this State; and for other purposes,” 7 Stat. S.C. 470 (1835); “AN
127
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Under these laws, any black sailor who entered the port of Charleston
would be immediately seized and incarcerated for the time that the
sailor’s ship was in port. When the ship left port, the sailor would be
placed on board, provided that the ship captain paid the jail fees for the
free black.
The Negro Seamen’s Acts presumptively violated the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the Constitution when applied to free blacks from
other states and violated various treaties when applied to free blacks
from other countries.135 South Carolina, however, saw these as simple
police regulations—health and safety regulations—designed to protect
the state from an inherently dangerous class: free blacks. Here the
construction of race—the notion that blacks are inherently dangerous
people136—undermined interstate comity, and severely impacted
America’s domestic international law. These laws also affected our
foreign relations and put the nation in opposition to basic human
rights—that free people from one country could visit another country.
South Carolina’s Negro Seamen’s Acts came before a federal court in
Elkison v. Deliesseline.137 In 1822, Charleston authorities imprisoned
Henry Elkison, a black British subject. Elkison applied for a writ of
habeas corpus from United States Supreme Court Justice William
Johnson, a native of South Carolina, who was riding circuit at the time.
A South Carolina states’ rights organization hired two leading
proslavery activists, Benjamin F. Hunt and Isaac E. Holmes, to oppose
the writ.
In oral argument, before Justice Johnson, Hunt asserted that under
its police powers South Carolina could incarcerate free blacks entering
the state, because to do otherwise would make the state “guilty of an act,
tending to self-destruction.”138 Hunt admitted that Congress had “an
exclusive right,” under the Constitution to regulate commerce, but he
denied that South Carolina’s act infringed on congressional power.139 He
compared South Carolina’s law to a New York law allowing the
ACT the more effectually to prohibit Free Negroes and Persons of Colour from entering
into this State; and for other purposes,” 7 Stat. S.C. 463 (1823).
135
Paul Finkelman, The Constitution and the Intentions of the Framers: The Limits of
Historical Analysis, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 349 (1989).
136
See Paul Finkelman, The Crime of Color, 67 TUL. L. REV. 2063 (1993), for more on this
theory.
137
Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 F. Cas. 493 (C.C.D.S.C. 1823) (No. 4,366).
138
BENJAMIN F. HUNT, THE ARGUMENT OF BENJAMIN FANEUIL HUNT, IN THE CASE OF THE
ARREST OF THE PERSON CLAIMING TO BE A BRITISH SEAMAN . . . BEFORE THE HON. JUDGE
JOHNSON, CIRCUIT JUDGE OF THE UNITED STATES, FOR 6TH CIRCUIT 12–14 (1823), reprinted in 2
FREE BLACKS, SLAVES, AND SLAVEOWNERS IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL COURTS 1 (Paul
Finkelman ed., 1988).
139
Id. at 12.
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quarantine of vessels and individuals.
For South Carolina, the
“contagion” feared was not disease, but free blacks.140
Hunt boldly asserted that the slave states were exempt from certain
constitutional provisions because the federal government could not
interfere with any law which might affect the domestic institutions of the
state. South Carolina’s right to regulate free blacks from other states
“was one, which from its nature, under the peculiar circumstances of her
slave population, she could not and has not surrendered to the Federal
Government.”141
Hunt’s argument went directly to the issue of domestic international
law. South Carolina’s white population believed free blacks were a
thoroughly dangerous class of people, who could undermine their
society. Thus, South Carolina was prepared to deny basic rights to
citizens of other countries or states, solely on the basis of race.
Anticipating Story’s theories of comity, Hunt argued that South Carolina
was only willing to extend comity to aliens whose presence in the state
did not, to use Story’s language, “prejudice the powers or rights” of
South Carolina.142
In his circuit court opinion, Supreme Court Justice William Johnson
asserted that South Carolina’s law was flatly “unconstitutional and
void.”143 Johnson declared the law was altogether irreconcilable with the
powers of the general government; that it necessarily compromises the
public peace, and, “tends to embroil us with, if not separate us from, our
sister states; in short, that it leads to a dissolution of the Union, and
implies a direct attack upon the sovereignty of the United States.”144 In
effect, Johnson argued that the Constitution suspended the power of
South Carolina to act as an independent legal entity, and thus to
unilaterally decide who could enter the state and who could not. Justice
Johnson believed “every arrest made under it subjects the parties making
it to an action of trespass.”145 Unfortunately for Elkison, Johnson
asserted that he lacked the power to issue a writ of habeas corpus or in
any other way interfere with the law. The law was unconstitutional, but
the parties could find no justice in the federal courts. Johnson, in effect,
refused to enforce his ruling.

Id. at 14.
Id. at 4.
142
STORY, CONFLICT, supra note 48, at 30. See also HUNT, supra note 138, at 4 (discussing a
South Carolina law that directed Sheriffs to hold in custody all Africans arriving at South
Carolina ports until the ship they arrived on is ready to set sail).
143
Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 F. Cas. 493, 494 (C.C.D.S.C. 1823) (No. 4,366).
144
Id.
145
Id. at 496.
140
141
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South Carolina was not the only state to adopt restrictions on
migrants based on color. By 1860 every southern state prohibited the
migration of free blacks.146 Southern states believed free blacks
threatened slavery and would have a pernicious influence on the
behavior of slaves. Thus, the notion of race, and belief that race was tied
to criminality and danger, affected the domestic international law of the
United States and led to one state refusing to respect the rights of people
who were citizens of another state. Through these statutes, the American
South rejected the basic human rights of citizens of other nations and
states.
Initially, the free states acquiesced in this result. Perhaps they acted
in this way because Elkison was a British subject and because few
politicians in the North cared much about the fate of free blacks. But, the
rise of the antislavery movement and the growing sectional tensions over
slavery and race led to a change of attitude in Massachusetts. The Bay
State was particularly affected by these laws because of its large number
of free black seamen.
In 1839, the Massachusetts legislature demanded a repeal of the
Black Seamen’s Acts. The legislature declared it was the “paramount
duty of the state to protect its citizens in the enjoyment and exercise of all
their rights.”147 In 1842, over 150 Bostonians asked Congress to intervene
to prevent the imprisonment of northern black seamen.148
The
petitioners, including many conservative businessmen, asked Congress
to “render effectual in their behalf . . . the privileges of citizenship,
secured by the Constitution of the United States.”149 A House committee
vainly recommended favorable action on the petition.150
With Congress unable or unwilling to act on the issue,
Massachusetts tried direct negotiations with the two most important
southern states implementing these laws: South Carolina and Louisiana.
Acting as if it were dealing with foreign nations, Massachusetts, in 1844,
sent Samuel Hoar to Charleston and Henry Hubbard to New Orleans as
official state commissioners to negotiate a compromise on this issue. The
missions were fiascoes. Hoar spent a single night in Charleston before
officials told him they could not guarantee his safety. After Hoar had
Paul Finkelman, States Rights North and South in Antebellum America, in AN UNCERTAIN
TRADITION: CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE HISTORY OF THE SOUTH 125, 132–33 (Kermit Hall
& James W. Ely, Jr. eds., 1989).
147
Report of the Joint Committee on the Deliverance of Citizens, Liable to be sold as Slaves, H.R.
REP. NO. 38 (Mass. 1839).
148
FREE COLORED SEAMEN—MAJORITY AND MINORITY REPORTS, H.R. Doc. No. 80-2, at 1
(1843) [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT].
149
Id.
150
Id. at 6–7.
146
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returned to Massachusetts, the South Carolina legislature gratuitously
asked the governor to expel him from the state, declaring that Hoar was
an “emissary sent . . . with avowed purpose of interfering with” South
Carolina’s “institutions, and disturbing her peace.”151 In Louisiana,
Hubbard faced the very real prospect of being lynched. He left New
Orleans on the same day he arrived. Subsequent communications from
Massachusetts to these states were fruitless.152
After the abortive missions by Hoar and Hubbard, the Georgia
legislature jumped to the defense of South Carolina and Louisiana. In an
analysis, which anticipated Chief Justice Roger B. Taney’s Dred Scott
opinion, the Georgia legislature asserted that each state, “in the exercise
of their sovereign rights,” could determine for itself who was a citizen
and who was not. The southern states “did not regard” free blacks as
citizens, a fact “of which the authorities of Massachusetts could not have
been ignorant at the time of her aggressions.” The legislature declared
that “the people of South Carolina, Louisiana, Georgia, as well as all the
States, claim the right of thinking for themselves.”153 In doing so, they
chose to reject any claims of citizenship and obligations of comity
towards free blacks from other states. In the language of human rights,
the states of the Deep South were ready to assert the right to decide who
was entitled to such rights and who was not.
These incidents were not quickly forgotten in the North. When
introducing what eventually became the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution, Congressman John Bingham gave the example of Hoar’s
expulsion from South Carolina as one reason why the amendment was
needed.154 The Fourteenth Amendment would in fact overrule the right
of the states to ban the movement of citizens from other states, and thus
apply a fundamental human right to the domestic international law of
the United States. Even the post-Civil War court, which was consistently
reluctant to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment to further civil rights—
what can be called domestic human rights—accepted the idea that the
New Amendment protected a right to travel. Thus, even while virtually
destroying the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment in The Slaughterhouse Cases,155 Justice Miller did admit that
South Carolina on the Mission of Samuel Hoar: December 5, 1844, reprinted in STATE
DOCUMENTS ON FEDERAL RELATIONS: THE STATES AND THE UNITED STATES 238 (Herman V.
Ames ed., 1970).
152
HENRY WILSON, HISTORY OF THE RISE AND FALL OF THE SLAVE POWER IN AMERICA 576–
86 (1872).
153
Report of the Committee on the State of the Republic, assented to Dec. 19, 1845, ACTS OF
GEORGIA 209–11 (1845).
154
CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 157–58 (1866).
155
83 U.S. 36, 39–40 (1873).
151
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one of the concrete privileges and immunities of federal citizenship was
the right to travel from place to place. Before the Civil War the South
denied this right to free blacks and, in the case of Hoar and Hubbard,
also to whites who supported the rights for free blacks. However,
despite the apparent constitutionalization of this right, the former slave
states resisted a full application of the principle until the late 1960s.156
C. Former Slaves Returning to the South After Sojourn or Emancipation in
the North
Initially most southern states accepted the concept articulated by
Somerset v. Stewart that a slave voluntarily brought to a free jurisdiction
became free. In his opinion in Aves, Chief Justice Shaw quoted a
Louisiana case and a Kentucky case supporting this position.157
Indicative of this early position was Harry v. Decker & Hopkins, where the
Mississippi Supreme Court declared that courts should decide “in favour
of liberty” when facing such questions.158
By and large the early southern cases dealing with slave transit were
surprisingly non-racialized and also surprisingly respectful of the
fundamental rights of free blacks. Southern jurists in Missouri,159
Virginia,160 Kentucky,161 Louisiana,162 and Mississippi,163 applied the
Somerset doctrine without much concern for race. These states accepted
that slavery was protected by international law and certainly by the
constitutions and laws of their own states. But they also accepted the
idea that freedom was a fundamental human right, and that slavery,
156
See e.g., the Virginia laws and decisions at issue in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
Here the U.S. Supreme Court struck down Virginia’s laws, and all other state laws which
made it a crime for people of different races to marry. Id. Under these laws, people
lawfully married in one state could not travel to other states where their interracial
marriages were illegal. See also PETER WALLENSTEIN, TELL THE COURT I LOVE MY WIFE:
RACE, MARRIAGE, AND LAW—AN AMERICAN HISTORY (2002) (giving a history of state laws,
which make interracial marriage a crime).
157
See also Rankin v. Lydia, 9 Ky. (2 A.K. Marsh) 467 (1820) (being cited by Shaw);
Lunsford v. Coquillon, 2 Mart (n.s.) 401 (La. 1824) (being cited by Shaw).
158
Harry v. Decker & Hopkins, 1 Miss. (1 Walker) 36 (1818).
159
Winny v. Whitesides, 1 Mo. 472 (1824). See also FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION,
supra note 81, at 217–28 (discussing the Missouri cases).
160
Betty v. Horton, 32 Va. (5 Leigh) 615 (1833); Hunter v. Fulcher, 28 Va. (1 Leigh) 172
(1829); Spotts v. Gillaspie, 27 Va. (6 Rand.) 566 (1828); Griffith v. Fanny, 21 Va. (Gilmer) 143
(1820).
161
Rankin, 9 Ky. (2 A.K. Marsh) 467; FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION, supra note 81, at
190–205 (discussing the cases following and supporting Rankin).
162
See Lunsford, 2 Mart. (n.s.) 401; FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION, supra note 81, at
206–16 (discussing Lunsford and other Louisiana cases).
163
See Harry, 1 Miss. (1 Walker) 36; FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION, supra note 81, at
228–35 (discussing Mississippi cases).
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while legitimate under international and domestic law, had to be
supported by local positive law or treaty. Ironically, some of these early
cases used race as a marker, not to protect slavery, but to protect
freedom. Thus, while blackness created a presumption of slavery, a
mixed blood heritage created a presumption of freedom.164 In Adelle v.
Beauregard the Louisiana Court upheld the freedom of a mulatto woman
who had lived in New York. It is not clear if the court based its decision
on her mixed-race heritage, her residence in New York, or a combination
of the two, which together shifted to Beauregard the burden of proving
that Adelle was a slave, rather than requiring Adelle to prove she was
free.
D. Dred Scott v. Sandford
Throughout the 1830s and 1840s most southern states still followed
the Somerset rule, although with increasing reluctance in Mississippi,
Virginia, and a few other places.165 Courts in Louisiana, Kentucky, and
Missouri, however, continued to accept the idea that foreign law could
free a slave, and once free, the slave was always free.166 As late as 1850
an obscure slave named Dred Scott won his freedom from a St. Louis
Circuit Court based on his previous residence in Illinois and at Fort
Snelling, in present day Minnesota, which at the time was part of the
Wisconsin Territory. This area had been made free by the Missouri
Compromise of 1820.
Dred Scott’s owner, Mrs. Irene Emerson, refused to accept the result
in this case. She appealed to the Missouri Supreme Court, which set the
stage for a reversal of southern jurisprudence on slave transit, and for
federal intervention leading to a full racialization of domestic
international law in the United States and a rejection of the human rights
implications of Somerset.
In Scott v. Emerson167 the Missouri Supreme Court reversed nearly
thirty years of precedents, dating from the very beginning of the state, to
hold that Dred Scott did not gain his freedom by living in free
jurisdictions. The opinion of the court was fundamentally political, with
Justice William Scott arguing that “[t]imes are not now as they were
when the former decisions on this subject were made.”168 Justice Scott
complained of a “dark and fell spirit” that had taken over the free states
164
Adelle v. Beauregard, 1 Mart. (o.s.) 183 (La. 1810); Gobu v. Gobu, 1 N.C. (Tay.) 188
(1802); Hudgins v. Wrights, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 134 (1806).
165
FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION, supra note 81, at 189.
166
Id. at 181–235.
167
Scott v. Emerson, 15 Mo. 576 (1852).
168
Id.
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and led them to attack the institutions of the South.169 Quoting Story’s
treatise on conflicts, he noted that “the comity of nations is derived
altogether from the voluntary consent of the State by which it is shown,
and is inadmissible when it is contrary to its known policy or prejudicial
to its interests.”170 Emancipating slaves was “contrary” to the interests of
Missouri, and the state supreme court would have no part of it.
While mostly an attack on the free states, the majority opinion also
wandered into the realm of racial theory. Justice Scott denied that
slavery harmed blacks, and in fact argued that slaves in America were
better off than:
the cruel, uncivilized negro in Africa. When the
condition of our slaves is contrasted with the state of
their miserable race in Africa; when their civilization,
intelligence and instruction in religious truths are
considered . . . we are almost persuaded, that the
introduction of slavery amongst us was, in the
providence of God, who makes the evil passions of men
subservient to His own glory, a means of placing that
unhappy race within the pale of civilized nations.171
If this was so, then it made no sense for Missouri to give force to
either the laws of Illinois or of the United States that emancipated a
slave. Blacks were better off as slaves, free blacks were a dangerous class
of people, and slaves were a valuable form of property. Thus, Missouri
rejected the notion that it should give any respect to law of the free states
or of the national government that could make slaves free people.
The position of the Missouri Supreme Court raises, for the modern
reader, a new and perverse sense of what “human rights law” can look
like. The Missouri Court had accepted and adopted the proslavery
theories of race and religion that had been growing since Thomas
Jefferson published his Notes on the State of Virginia in 1784, arguing that
blacks were mentally and morally inferior to whites.172 In effect, the
Court held that because blacks were naturally inferior to whites, and
Africa was deeply uncivilized, there should be a different standard of
human rights for blacks. It was not a violation of human rights to
enslave blacks, but on the contrary human rights for blacks, according to
the Missouri Court, required enslavement.
Id.
Id.
171
Id.
172
For a brief introduction to this literature, and an easy access to Jefferson’s racial
views, see PAUL FINKELMAN, DEFENDING SLAVERY: PROSLAVERY IN THE OLD SOUTH (2003).
169
170
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Two years after losing before the state supreme court, Dred Scott
managed to bring his case into federal court. He lost at trial and took his
case to the United States Supreme Court. After two sets of oral
arguments, the Court finally decided the case in March 1857.
Undoubtedly the most controversial case of the century,173 the case did
not fully settle the conflicts-of-law question raised by slave transit in free
states. Relying on Strader v. Graham,174 which the Court decided in 1850,
the majority Justices easily reaffirmed that a slave state had the right to
decide, for itself, if it would honor any slave’s claim to freedom based on
free state residence.
This resolved Scott’s claim to freedom based on his earlier residence
in Illinois. It did not, however, solve the problem of his residence at Fort
Snelling in the federal territory made free by the Missouri Compromise.
Missouri might choose to ignore Illinois law and declare that his
residence in the state did not make him free. But the Missouri
Compromise was a federal law, and under the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution175 the Missouri judges were bound to enforce it. In his
controversial opinion, Chief Justice Taney solved the problem by
declaring the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional.
In addition to these two prongs of his holding, Taney held that
blacks could never be citizens of the United States and that historically
they “had no rights which the white man was bound to respect.”176
Taney long held this position. As attorney general in the 1830s, he
argued that “[blacks] are not looked upon as citizens by the contracting
parties who formed the Constitution. They were evidently not supposed
to be included by the term citizens.”177 Speaking for the Court, Taney
stated the issue:
The question is simply this: Can a negro, whose
ancestors were imported into this country, and sold as
slaves, become a member of the political community
formed and brought into existence by the Constitution of
the United States, and as such become entitled to all the
rights, and privileges, and immunities, guarantied by
See DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN
LAW AND POLITICS (1978); FINKELMAN, DRED SCOTT V. SANDFORD, supra note 110.
174
Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 82 (1850).
175
U.S. CONST., art. VI, § 2. The Supremacy Clause states: “This Constitution, and the
Laws of the United which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law
of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby . . . .” Id.
176
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 407 (1856).
177
Unpublished Opinion of Attorney General Taney, quoted in CARL BRENT SWISHER,
ROGER B. TANEY 154 (1935).
173
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that instrument to the citizen? One of which rights is the
privilege of suing in a court of the United States in the
cases specified in the Constitution.178
Taney knew that blacks voted in nearly half the states at the time of
the adoption of the Constitution. And even though blacks lost political
rights in a number of states, in some states they still were citizens with
the same rights as white citizens. In some states blacks were attorneys
and held public offices.179 They could vote equally with whites in five
states180 and had limited voting rights in three others.181 Still, Taney
found a way around this evidence. He claimed that:
[i]n discussing this question, we must not confound
the rights of citizenship which a State may confer within
its own limits, and the rights of citizenship as a member
of the Union. It does not by any means follow, because
he has all the rights and privileges of a citizen of a State,
that he must be a citizen of the United States. He may
have all of the rights and privileges of the citizen of a
State, and yet not be entitled to the rights and privileges
of a citizen in any other State.182
Taney based this novel argument entirely on race using his slanted
and one-sided history of the founding period. Ignoring the history of
black voting, the Chief Justice nevertheless argued that at the founding
of the nation, blacks were either all slaves or, if free, without any political
or legal rights. He declared that blacks:
are not included, and were not intended to be included,
under the word ‘citizens’ in the Constitution, and can
therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which
that instrument provides for and secures to citizens of
the United States. On the contrary, they were at that
time [1787] considered as a subordinate and inferior
class of beings, who had been subjugated by the
dominant race, and, whether emancipated or not, yet
Sandford, 60 U.S. (10 How.) at 403.
Paul Finkelman, Not Only the Judges’ Robes Were Black: African-American Lawyers as
Social Engineers, 47 STAN. L. REV. 161 (1994).
180
Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Massachusetts.
181
They had to meet a property requirement in New York; they could vote in school
board elections in Michigan; in Ohio people of mixed ancestry who were more than half
white could vote.
182
Sandford, 60 U.S. (10 How.) at 405.
178
179
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remained subject to their authority, and had no rights or
privileges but such as those who held the power and the
Government might choose to grant them.183
According to Taney, at the founding of the United States blacks were “so
far inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was bound to
respect.”184 Thus, he concluded that blacks could never be citizens of the
United States, even if they were born in the country and considered to be
citizens of the states in which they lived.
This racially based conclusion did not fully decide the conflicts-oflaw issue since it did not prevent northern states from freeing visiting
slaves. The decision did, however, guarantee freedom to the slave states
to treat free blacks in whatever way they might wish.
It
constitutionalized the Missouri Court’s view that human rights for
blacks meant enslavement.
While Taney did not address the issue of slaves being brought to free
states, Justice Samuel Nelson offered an ominous hint in his concurrence.
Perhaps with the Lemmon case in mind, he wrote:
A question has been alluded to, on the argument,
namely: the right of the master with his slave of transit
into or through a free State, on business or commercial
pursuits, or in the exercise of a Federal right, or the
discharge of a Federal duty, being a citizen of the United
States, which is not before us. This question depends
upon different considerations and principles from the
one in hand, and turns upon the rights and privileges
secured to a common citizen of the republic under the
Constitution of the United States. When that question
arises, we shall be prepared to decide it.185
It takes little imagination to guess how the Court would decide such a
case if it had come before it.
E. Mitchell v. Wells and the Final Racialization of Antebellum Domestic
International Law
In 1846, Edward Wells, a Mississippi planter, took his slave Nancy to
Ohio, where he formally manumitted her. This was more an act of love
than charity. In addition to being his slave, Nancy was Wells’ daughter.
183
184
185

Id. at 404–05.
Id. at 407.
Id. at 468 (Nelson, J. concurring).
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Wells also took Nancy’s mother to Indiana, where he manumitted her
and bought her land. In 1848 Wells died and bequeathed to his daughter
three thousand dollars and two very personal items: his bed and his
watch.
Nancy Wells spent the next decade attempting to recover her legacy.
In the end she failed. In Mitchell v. Wells186 Justice William Harris ruled
that whatever her status was in Ohio, Wells would always be considered
a slave in Mississippi. This was not a slave transit case in the normal
sense. Nancy had not gained her freedom in Ohio through the
application of the Somerset principle while her master traveled to that
state. On the contrary, Edward Wells took Nancy to Ohio with the
express plan of freeing her, and he did so according to all the rules and
regulations of that state. Thus, the master’s deliberate acts, not the
intervention of a free state, led to Nancy’s freedom. Nor did Nancy seek
to assert her freedom in Mississippi. She had no interest in living in the
state, and there is no indication that she ever physically returned to
Mississippi after her father’s death.
While not a transit case, this case was very much an example of
American domestic international law. The issue was whether Mississippi
would recognize Nancy’s status in Ohio, solely for the purpose of
inheriting her legacy. Since Mississippi had no rule that barred residents
of other states from inheriting in Mississippi, there was no reason, it
would seem, to deny Nancy her inheritance.
But, Justice Harris developed a reason. Nancy was born a slave, and
was of African (and also of course white) ancestry. Race and the
circumstances of her birth were the key to Nancy’s status. She was born
a slave in Mississippi and, under Harris’s view, would always be one.
Harris would not recognize Nancy’s new status because “comity is
subordinate to sovereignty, and cannot, therefore, contravene our public
policy, or the rights, interests, or safety of our State or people.”187 In
other words, Mississippi would flatly deny that another state could
convey any rights on a Mississippi born slave. “[T]he status of a
[Mississippi] slave,” he asserted, “is fixed by our laws, and cannot be
changed elsewhere, so as to give him a new status in this State, without
our consent.”188
This decision was surely the highpoint of proslavery legal theory.
But, Harris’s argument was fundamentally also about race and the
emerging southern notion that human rights for blacks required slavery.
Turning notions of comity inside out, Harris argued that Ohio violated
186
187
188
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the unwritten rules of domestic interstate comity in the United States by
“seek[ing] to introduce into the family of States, as equals or associates, a
caste of [a] different color, and of acknowledged inferiority, who, though
existing among us at the time of our compact of Union, were excluded
from the sisterhood of common consent.”189 Harris argued that Ohio
forced a breakdown in interstate comity by violating the rules of the
United States as Harris understood them. Comity with Ohio was
impossible because Ohio:
forgetful of her constitutional obligations to the whole
race, and afflicted with a negro-mania, which inclines her
to descend, rather than elevate herself in the scale of
humanity, chooses to take to her embrace, as citizens,
the neglected race . . . incapable of the blessings of free
government, and occupying, in the order of nature, an
intermediate state between the irrational animal and the
white man.190
In reality, blacks had virtually no political rights in Ohio191 and were
certainly not equal in the state. But, this reality, or any other, was no
longer relevant to Harris. His goal was to use this case to reaffirm that
Mississippi would never grant comity to any free state rule or decision
that gave blacks any rights at all. He furthermore saw an opportunity to
chastise the North for its opposition to slavery and its growing support
of some rights for blacks. He considered it “disrespectful” to Mississippi
and a “lawless interference” with Mississippi’s rights192 for Ohio to even
allow a Mississippi master to free his slave. The mere suggestion that
Mississippi should recognize the new status of Nancy Wells truly
repulsed Harris:
But when I am told that Ohio has not only the right
thus to degrade and disgrace herself, and wrong us, but
also, that she has the right to force her new associates
Id. at 261.
Id. at 262–63 (emphasis added).
191
See Finkelman, Not Only the Judges’ Robes Were Black, supra note 179, at 161–209
(discussing that where completely segregated schools existed, blacks were allowed to vote
for members of their school boards and that Blacks in Ohio were not, at this time,
prevented from holding office as evidenced by one black, John Langston, who had been
elected to office in the hotbed of radical abolition, Oberlin, Ohio). At this time blacks could
not serve on juries or in the militia, two key components of nineteenth century citizenship.
On the history of black rights in Ohio, see Paul Finkelman, Strange Career of Race
Discrimination in Antebellum Ohio, 55 CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIV. L. REV. 373–408 (2004).
192
Mitchell, 37 Miss. at 263.
189
190
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into the Mississippi branch of the American family, to
claim and exercise rights here, which our laws have
always denied to this inferior race, and that Mississippi
is bound to yield obedience to such demand, I am at loss
to understand upon what principles of law or reason, of
courtesy or justice, such a claim can be founded.193
Harris concluded his attack on Ohio with an analogy that showed why
race, more than slavery or economics, was at the center of the breakdown
on American domestic international law:
Suppose that Ohio, still further afflicted with her
peculiar philanthropy, should determine to descend
another grade in the scale of her peculiar humanity, and
claim to confer citizenship on the chimpanzee or the
ourang-outang (the most respectable of the monkey
tribe), are we to be told that “comity” will require of the
States not thus demented, to forget their own policy and
self-respect, and lower their own citizens and
institutions in the scale of being, to meet the necessities
of the mongrel race thus attempted to be introduced into
the family of sisters in this confederacy?194
Justice Alexander Handy dissented from this opinion, and argued
that as long as Nancy Wells never returned to Mississippi, she could
inherit her legacy as a free person in Ohio. Handy was not, however,
“soft” on black rights. He declared that “negro emancipation” anywhere
was “an evil,”195 but he was willing to recognize that Ohio had the right
to subject itself to this “evil,” and thus confer the status of a free person
on anyone. He would grant comity to Ohio, not because he liked what
Ohio did, but rather out of “respect to the nation of which the person,
whose individual right is involved, is a member.”196 To do otherwise,
would degrade the jurisprudence of Mississippi. If Ohio persisted in
opposing the enforcement of the fugitive slave laws and in other
antislavery policies, Handy had an alternative to the denial of comity:
Whilst the confederacy continues, we cannot justify
ourselves as a State in violating its spirit and principles,
because other States have, in some respects, been false to
193
194
195
196
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their duties and obligations. It may justify us in
dissolving the compact, but not in violating our
obligations under it whilst it continues.197
In Handy’s view, secession, not a denial of comity, was the proper
answer to Ohio’s “negro-mania.” Within two years Mississippi would
take that route. When foreign nations cannot get along, within the
context of international law, the resort is often to war. The war that
followed Mississippi’s secession indicates how profoundly antebellum
American domestic international law was very much like the
international law that existed between separate nations.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Civil War and the Constitutional Amendments that followed it
fundamentally reordered American federalism. The process served to
finally settle certain issues in favor of racial fairness. Settlement,
however, did not take root quickly. More than a century after the Civil
War ended, notions of race and denials of comity still affected interstate
movement of citizens.
From the end of Reconstruction until the middle third of the
twentieth century, the problem of interracial marriage affected American
domestic international law and the application of fundamental notions of
human rights to American society. It was a problem deeply connected to
the social construction of race and the politics of racial intolerance. For
the South, interracial marriage raised a problem similar to that of slavery
in the North. Northerners found slavery immoral, beyond the pale of
legal protection, and a direct threat to their free society. Similarly, many
southern whites in the period between 1870 to 1960 found interracial
marriage equally repugnant and dangerous to the well-being of their
segregated society.198 Before Loving v. Virginia199 in 1967, the interstate
recognition of interracial marriages was an issue of domestic conflicts-oflaw.200 The state prosecuted Richard and Mildred Loving because the
Id. at 286.
See WALLENSTEIN, TELL THE COURT I LOVE MY WIFE, supra note 156.
199
388 U.S. 1 (1967).
200
On Loving and similar cases, see WALLENSTEIN, TELL THE COURT I LOVE MY WIFE, supra
note 156; Emily Field Van Tassel, “Only the Law Would Rule Between Us”: Antimiscegenation,
the Moral Economy of Dependency, and the Debate Over Rights After Civil War, 70 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 873 (1995); Peter Wallenstein, Law and the Boundaries of Place and Race in Interracial
Marriage: Interstate Comity, Racial Identity, and Miscegenation Laws in North Carolina, South
Carolina, and Virginia, 1860s–1960s, 32 AKRON L. REV. 557 (1999) [hereinafter Boundaries];
Peter Wallenstein, Race, Marriage, and the Law of Freedom: Alabama and Virginia, 1860s–1960s,
70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 371 (1994).
197
198
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state of Virginia refused to recognize their marriage, which had legally
been performed in another jurisdiction, Washington, D.C. Virginia
based its refusal on race. The Lovings were not the first to be prosecuted
in Virginia for this race-based crime.
In 1878, in Kinney v.
201
Commonwealth, the Virginia Court of Appeals upheld the conviction of
Andrew Kinney, an African-American, for “lewdly associating and
cohabitating”202 with Mahala Miller, a white woman he had married in
Washington, D.C. Virginia did not limit its obsession with race, and
racial “purity” to African-Americans. Similarly, in 1955 in Naim v.
Naim,203 Virginia’s highest court ruled that a marriage between a man of
Chinese ancestry who married a white woman in North Carolina was
illegal in Virginia.204 In 1962, the same court denied a divorce to a white
woman who married a Filipino in New Jersey.205 The Virginia court held
the marriage was invalid in the first place and, thus, no divorce was
possible.
All of these cases illustrate the problem of domestic international law
and the U.S. Constitution’s requirement that the states give “Full Faith
and Credit” to the “public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of
every other State.”206 Because all of these marriages were valid in the
jurisdictions in which they were performed, Virginia’s laws appear to
have violated both the letter and spirit of the Constitution.207 These
issues are of course also tied to human rights. In Loving, the Court
accepted the idea that marriage is a fundamental right. It is also a
fundamental human right. Even without knowing it, the Loving Court
was applying concepts of basic human rights through the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Lawrence v. Texas208
the Court held the government may not “demean” the “existence or
control” the “destiny” of gay couples by “making their private sexual
conduct a crime.”209 This certainly speaks to issues of “human rights” in
our domestic law. In the aftermath of Loving and the Civil Rights
Revolution of the 1960s, the relationship between race and American
domestic international law has been less important, but it has hardly
disappeared. On the other hand, issues of gender, sexuality, and
71 Va. (30 Gratt.) 858 (1878).
Id. at 858–59.
203
87 S.E.2d 749 (Va. 1955).
204
Wallenstein, Boundaries, supra note 200, at 573.
205
Calma v. Calma, 128 S.E.2d 440 (Va. 1962).
206
U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
207
Under this theory the “Defense of Marriage Act,” is also unconstitutional. See supra
note 45 discussing the “Defense of Marriage Act.”
208
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
209
Id. at 578.
201
202
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marriage are remaking our international domestic law. Nevertheless,
new connections between race and human rights emerge. The most
recent Supreme Court case involving interstate movement focused on
the rights of new migrants to receive public assistance.210 The Supreme
Court struck down a California welfare regulation, requiring differential
payments for people who recently moved into the state. Part of the
rationale for this decision was the concept, now deeply ingrained in
American law, that, at a minimum, the Privileges and Immunities Clause
of the United States Constitution guarantees the right of people to travel
and move from state to state. This makes good sense, since the framers
of the 14th Amendment had seen the pernicious influence of the black
seamen’s laws on interstate relations and the rights of both black and
white Americans. Perhaps this is a signal that American constitutional
law, domestic international law, and human rights law will move away
from using race as a criterion for determining status. However, as long
as police departments continue to use a combination of race and out-ofstate license plates in the profile stops,211 we can only wonder if
America’s third full century will be able to shed the legacy of the first
two. Similarly, race is clearly a factor in sentencing and convictions for
capital cases, even if the Supreme Court refuses to take notice of it.212
Similarly immigrant status has become an issue as aliens face special
hurdles in capital cases.213 Recent legislation in Arizona authorizing the
police to stop people who “look like” illegal aliens will only raise the
potential for harassment and denial of basic rights, due to racial
stereotyping.214 Thus, it seems likely that issues of international human
rights, race, American domestic law, and America’s domestic
international law will continue for the foreseeable future.
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